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Abstract :  The age of women at first marriage is a crucial determinant of the women's education, 
among other topics of interest. This paper outlines a theoretical and empirical approach of this issue 
in the valley of the Senegal River. Primary field data is examined firstly to motivate a simple game-
theoretic model whereby players interact simultaneously about the age of the women at first 
marriage and about the question whether the marriage will be arranged or not. Testing the 
predictions of this model using cross-section data raises a number of methodological issues and 
requires the estimation of two reduced-form equations, a probit model (marriage consent) and a 
duration model (age at first marriage). The observed linkage between the predicted parts of the 
endogenous variables provides support for the theoretical model and suggests that, in the studied 
sample, making marriage occur earlier than what is optimal in the eyes of the bride's family is an  
effective way to pre-empt conflicts of interests with the bride herself about the choice of the groom.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The neo-classical theory of marriage is a simple extension of the competitive market paradigm 
(Becker, 1981). In particular, the side holding the scarce resource on the market (men or women, 
depending on the case) is predicted to claim a side payment as an « equilibrium price ». Such a 
straightforward approach is compatible with a number of empirical evidence, both quantitative and 
qualitative (Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). On the other hand, it suffers from the conception of the 
household as a production unit where private goods are supplied with economies of scale or gains 
from specialization. A more intuitive and satisfactory representation of marriage and family pictures 
the household as a production unit of a local public good, where inputs are jointly provided by the 
members (Manser and Brown, 1980 ; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). This more recent theory better 
squares with facts such as the determination of the brideprice in anticipation of its impact on the 
married couple, e.g. violence, as in Bloch and Rao (2002) or divorce, as in Platteau & Gaspart 
(2006). These phenomena are tightly related to bargaining power and strategic relationships 
between agents, and it should come as no surprise that a game-theoretic approach is a more 
successful attempt at their explanation than a market-based model. 
In this paper, using firsthand data from the Senegal River Valley, we test game-theoretic predictions 
about marriage consent and the age of women at first marriage, emphasizing the role of the 
woman's bargaining power in her own family. Among the various topics of interest in the economic 
analysis of marriage, a recent survey by Quisumbing and Hallman (2003) has stressed the 
importance of the age of women at first marriage by raising several empirical and theoretical points. 
For one thing, marriage age is obviously correlated with education. A policy aiming at an impact on 
the women's education can easily miss its target if no insight on the age of women at first marriage 
is duly taken into account. On the other hand, assets brought by each partner into the newly formed 
household are not only a powerful determinant of the household's future prosperity, but also of the 
distribution of welfare within the household (Quisumbing and de la Brière, 2000). The contributions 
to the couple's starting assets, including respective education, is itself correlated with the age of the 
partners at the time of marriage. Finally, a special case of the two above remarks must be noticed. 
Age at first marriage is a determinant, e.g. through personal assets, of a woman's exit option, either 
in the perspective of divorce or in the perspective of elopement if her family is hostile to her 
marriage. This consideration will play a major role in the theoretical foundations that are build for 
the empirical estimations conducted in this paper. 
In a companion paper (Platteau and Gaspart, 2007), the interplay of brideprices and divorce 
probabilities is studied. We try to abstract away from these issues in the current undertaking, by 
way of assumptions that are detailed in the theoretical introduction to the estimations. However, it 
would be intuitively difficult to abstract away from the issue of marriage consent when focusing on 
the age at first marriage. Indeed, in the field that is covered by our dataset, both practices of 
arranged marriage and love marriage1 are common. It is a striking feature of our sample than almost 
all early marriages (i.e. the woman had not reached the age of 14, the modal age at first marriage 
being 15) were arranged by the parents. Also, the emphasis on the woman's bargaining power in her 
family draws attention to a potential conflict of interests when the parent's preferred groom does not 
coincide with the woman's own choice. Our game-theoretic foundations for the econometric model 
on marriage age rest crucially on the causality between marriage consent and the timing of the 
marriage. In other words, a strategic tension may make the daughter's marriage deviate from the 
family's preferred timing. On the one hand, parents may rush their daughter's marriage in the fear 
that she finds a suitor not fitting their interests (broadly defined, including parental altruism). On the 
other hand, they may delay a love marriage in the hope of making a less-than-ideal groom break up 
and of promoting their own candidate, thereby running the risk of seeing their daughter elope.  
                                                
1 A short expression meaning "a marriage that was sealed at the partners' initiative rather than their parents' ". 
The strategic timing of marriage and the role of the woman's bargaining power in her own family 
are at the heart of the empirical analysis that we conduct. Its implications are similar to a case of 
rationing. If marriage is concluded at an age different from the family's bliss point, incentive 
policies may fail to be effective. Especially, if a lot of marriages occur too early (compared to the 
family's preferences) because of strategic interplay, it is more promising to act on the causes of the 
rush rather than on the family's ideal age of marriage. The most frequent direction of rationing 
(too early or too late) is also a helpful information for the design of welfare-enhancing policy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the field surveyed, the data and the observed 
phenomena related to marriage. Section 3 shows a theoretical foundation for the empirical 
estimations conducted in section 4, after which we conclude.  
 
2. About the field and the data 
 
The field study, sample and data set is the same as in Platteau and Gaspart (2007). Data have been 
collected in 1998 in sixteen villages of the Senegal river valley.  Seven of the sample villages are 
located in the delta area (department of Dagana) while the remaining nine villages lie in the middle 
valley (departments of Podor and Matam). The majority of middle valley inhabitants are part of the 
Toucouleur ethnic group while the delta is inhabited mainly by Wolof people.  
In addition to focus group interviews, household questionnaires have been administered separately 
to 185 women, 60% of them in the middle valley. Unfortunately, a lot of missing information are 
related to the woman's first marriage, so that only 127 first marriages constitute the sample for this 
study. In one of the sampled villages of the middle valley, only one valid observation remains, so 
that we will assimilate this observation in the neighbouring village. The questionnaire elicits 
information about the current characteristics (education, age, occupation,) and personal histories 
of the women interviewed : all marriage events and contracts ; the reasons for elopements, divorces 
and separations ; the procedures in case of separation ; the attitudes of women and men with respect 
to marriage payments and polygamy ; the customary rules and effective practices governing 
womens access to land before and within marriage.  
Graph 1 shows the histogram of ages at first marriage. 
Graph 1 : Ages at first marriage 
 
The modal marriage age is 15 and two thirds of first marriages occur between 14 and 18 included. 
The mean of the variable is 16.6, it is bigger than the mode (15) and than the median (16), which is 
confirmed by the left-skewed shape of its distribution. The standard error of marriage age is equal 
to 3.2, a high figure for which the right tail of the distribution is responsible. Trimming the 6 
observations above age 22 would make the average drop to 16.2 and the standard error drop to 2.6. 
Their leverage power notwithstanding, these late occurrences of marriage are meaningful, as we 
will see in section 3, and there would be no reason to exclude them from the analysis.  
In the sequel, we will often present cross-tables of marriage age and other variables. Graph 1 
 age group |  arranged   love mar.|     Total  
 
 is remarkable that almost all early marriages are arranged (only 2 occurrences of the contrary). As 
 education |  arranged   love mar.|     Total  
 
he first level of education indicates that primary education was never completed, the second level 
provides a visual justification for splitting the sample into 4 marriage age groups : before 14, 14-15, 
16-18 and after 18. Since we focus on the interaction between marriage age and consent, our first 
table summarizes the occurrences and percentages of age groups for each type of consent.  
 
-----------+----------------------+----------  
 before 14 |        14          2 |        16  
           |     18.42       3.92 |     12.60  
-----------+----------------------+----------  
 14 and 15 |        26         16 |        42  
           |     34.21      31.37 |     33.07  
-----------+----------------------+----------  
  16 to 18 |        27         15 |        42  
           |     35.53      29.41 |     33.07  
-----------+----------------------+----------  
  after 18 |         9         18 |        27  
           |     11.84      35.29 |     21.26  
-----------+----------------------+----------  
     Total |        76         51 |       127  
           |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
(number of occurrences and column percentages) 
Table 1 : Marriage Age and Marriage Consent  
It
we will see, this can be interpreted as a hasty move intended to avoid the arrival of a suitor not 
fitting the family's interests. The higher frequency of comparatively late marriages (i.e. after 18) 
among love marriages (35%) points out at the fact that the correlation between marriage age and 
consent may be spurious and due to educational choices. Women going to school at and after a 
marriageable age would be likely to meet a suitor by themselves rather than by their parents' 
mediation. If this were the case, the topic under study would be completely determined by other 
considerations (i.e. educational choices) and intrinsically uninteresting. Fortunately, the following 
table shows that we are not chasing the proverbial red herring.  
 
-----------+----------------------+----------  
      none |        27         16 |        43  
           |     35.53      31.37 |     33.86  
-----------+----------------------+----------  
   primary |        41         26 |        67  
           |     53.95      50.98 |     52.76  
-----------+----------------------+----------  
 secondary |         8          9 |        17  
           |     10.53      17.65 |     13.39  
-----------+----------------------+----------  
     Total |        76         51 |       127  
           |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00   
(number of occurrences and column percentages) 
Table 2 : Education and Marriage Consent  
T
means that it was completed while secondary education was never undertaken with any success. 
The third and highest level of education means that some secondary education was achieved, 
whether the full secondary curriculum was completed or not. There is a striking absence of 
correlation between the woman's education and whether her marriage was arranged or not. A larger 
sample may enable us to take seriously the 7% difference between the two columns in the last row 
of the table, but in any case, it is clear that educational choices are not the only driving force in the 
story.  
 
A survey by Jejeebhoy (1995) shows that, across a number of studies and contexts, education is a 
 
           |              woman's education               
 age g
 
 successful attempt at secondary education is clearly a differentiating event in a woman's history 
hree dummy variables determined at village level will play a role in our analysis. Firstly, the 
 the enquiry is also a factor to be taken into account. For 
prominent factor for the postponement of marriage. Although education is not the focus of the 
present study, Table 3 shows that there is indeed a correlation between marriage age and education. 
 
roup |      none    primary  secondary |     Total  
-----------+---------------------------------+----------  
 before 14 |         7          9          0 |        16  
           |     16.28      13.43       0.00 |     12.60  
-----------+---------------------------------+----------  
 14 and 15 |        15         20          7 |        42  
           |     34.88      29.85      41.18 |     33.07  
-----------+---------------------------------+----------  
  16 to 18 |        16         23          3 |        42  
           |     37.21      34.33      17.65 |     33.07  
-----------+---------------------------------+----------  
  after 18 |         5         15          7 |        27  
           |     11.63      22.39      41.18 |     21.26  
-----------+---------------------------------+----------  
     Total |        43         67         17 |       127  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
(number of occurrences and column percentages) 
Table 3 : Education and Marriage Age  
A
in the context of our field study. The 11% difference between the frequencies of late marriages for 
women with no education and for women with primary education is far from being significant in 
itself. All in all, the correlation between education and marriage age is probably lower in our 
context than in many context previously studied. This prompts us to leave educational choices 
beyond the scope of this paper. They cannot be considered as a source of exogenous information in 
our undertaking about marriage age anyway, because they are simultaneously determined by the 
woman's family traits and plans. Also, they would have the same determinants as marriage age, 
making the identification of equations to be estimated even more difficult than it is. It is important 
to notice, as in table 2 and 3, that education does not make the correlation between marriage age and 
consent spurious, but this variable will play no further role in our analysis. 
 
T
ethnic or geographical dummy Toucouleur indicates whether the woman is a member of the 
Toucouleur ethnic group (81 of our 127 observations). This is perfectly correlated with residence in 
the middle valley of the Senegal River, while the delta is inhabited by Wolof people. Secondly, two 
dummies Land Opportunity 1 and 2 indicate villages whether women have exclusive access to a 
reserved land perimeter (5 villages out of 15, covering 71 out of our 127 observations), the special 
case of Land opportunity 2 being a government-regulated irrigated perimeter (2 villages covering 
30 observations). It is important to notice that the reserved perimeters are old enough to pre-date the 
marriages considered in our sample. Village-related dummies are rightfully considered as 
exogenous regressors in our analysis.  
The age of the women at the time of
example, over time, arranged marriages have become less of a overwhelmingly majoritarian 
practice. The histogram of the women's age is depicted on graph 2.  
Graph 2 : Woman's age at the time of interview  
 
he age of the interviewed women is a better time counter than the difference between the year of 
 consent |      mean  std.dev.   Quart.1    Median   Quart.3 
  
s is expected, love marriages occur for significantly younger women and the dispersion of 
mong the woman's personal traits, it is very difficult to find variables that can reasonably be 
T
the woman's first marriage and the year of the interview, the latter being endogenous since it 
depends on the woman's age at first marriage. The sample consists only of married women, so only 
the right tail of the distribution is akin to a women's sampled pyramid of ages. Age is summarized 
in table 4, conditionally on marriage consent. 
 
---------+-------------------------------------------------- 
arranged |     35.57     12.03        27        34      40.5 
love mar.|     30.02      8.43        24        29        35 
---------+-------------------------------------------------- 
   Total |     33.34     11.03        26        32        39 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 4 : Women's Age at the time of the interview 
A
women's age is much lower for those who have chosen their partner themselves. Both conditional 
distributions appear to be slightly left-skewed. Beside the impact of time and modernity on 
preferences, this time counter may also control for demographic trends, although Platteau and 
Gaspart (2007) found no evidence of a changing balance between genders in the region over the 
past 30 years.  
 
A
deemed exogenous in the context of the present study. These variables must bear information on the 
woman's life before marriage, since our motivations imply that her lot within marriage is influenced 
by the conditions under which her marriage takes place (i.e. her age at the time and whether the 
consent was hers or her parent's). Two variables meeting these requirements and having a clear 
theoretical meaning appear in our dataset. These are dummies indicating whether the woman had 
been granted access to a personal land plot by her family (Family plot) and whether the woman 
had an autonomous economic activity before marriage (Activity). While these variables have 
presumably be chosen by the woman's family in anticipation of their influence on her matrimonial 
future, they were on all counts predetermined when marriage occurred. Hence, they should be 
interpreted as proxies of exogenous family traits and preferences that may have an influence on the 
woman's age at first marriage and on consent allocation. Among those traits, the daughter's 
bargaining power is prominently mentioned by the literature (Quisumbing and de la Brière, 2000 ; 
Quisumbing and Hallman, 2003). This is also stresses by the theoretical construction laid out in 
section 3. As a rule of thumb, we will interpret the dummies Family Plot and Activity as proxies for 
the woman's bargaining power in her own family. Access to a family plot has been granted to 22 of 
the 127 members of our sample. Only 10 of them has reported an activity before marriage, 3 of 
which had also access to a family plot. Descriptive statistics of age at first marriage and marriage 
consent conditional on these two dummies do not make any noticeable relationships appear, in 
particular because of the small number of observations involved. Indeed, 98 out of 127 observations 
have a zero value for both dummies. 
An interesting demographic phenomenon could interfere with our study, namely the high migration 
quipped with the set of stylized facts just outlined, we are now ready to lay the ground for an 
3. A Simple Game-theoretic Framework 
e consider a game with 2 players, the woman (W) and her family (F), and 3 periods. In the first 
tegic moves are dictated by her type drawn by a move of Nature, it is more 
arametric values for the parents' utilities, we do not need to assume the 
                                               
outflows from the sampled villages. Indeed, migration is often undertaken by men rather than by 
women. An increasing scarcity of men could push up the age of women at first marriage in a way 
that may be captured only partially by a time counter or village dummies. However, it turns out that 
migration takes place in a way that interferes little with matrimonial issues. Typically, a migrant 
leaves as a bachelor and comes back to get married with a woman from his village or a 
neighbouring village (Platteau and Gaspart, 2007). He may then leave again for a few more years, 
but essentially his departure has no impact on the men's relative scarcity, not even at a local scale 
given the strong tendency towards endogamy.  
 
E
empirical assessment of the determinants of age at first marriage.  
 
 
W
period, the family may force an arranged marriage or wait. A Nature's move determines whether a 
suitor different from the family's preferred one presents itself ; this occurs with probability p. The 
second move by the family is a choice between a forced arranged marriage, a consent given to the 
woman's chosen suitor or a decision to wait. In the first case, the woman may choose to elope ; the 
family does not know of the woman's type, i.e. her propensity to elope with her chosen one or to 
conform to her parents' will. In the eyes of the family, elopement will occur with a probability φ (as 
a consequence of the woman's best choice given her type). In the event of family consenting to the 
woman's suitor, the game ends. In the third case, where the family imposes a delay on marriage, a 
Nature's move determines whether the woman's preferred suitor persists (which he does with 
probability q) or leaves. If he leaves, the marriage is arranged according to the family's will in the 
third period. If he stays, the family must again decide whether to consent or to force an arranged 
marriage, facing the same risk of elopement (probability φ) as if the arranged marriage were forced 
in the second period.  
Since the woman's stra
convenient to directly include her best response in a simplified tree, depicting the family's decision 
problem as a reduced-form of the game. The woman's utility is not mentioned for the same reason. 
Not focusing on the private goods produced by the woman's in her family or in her future 
household, we assume parametric values for the parents' utilities in the various terminal nodes. 
When an arranged marriage is concluded in the first period, the parents have a utility2 equal to 
U(D). Factor γ >1 multiplies the parents' utility when marriage is concluded at their preferred 
period, namely the second period of the game. We thus see their utility equal to γ U(D) if the event 
of an arranged marriage in period two, be it because no Romeo presented itself or because an 
arranged marriage was successfully imposed on their daughter. If they consent to a marriage with 
her daughter's own candidate, they have a utility equal to γ U(R). It is assumed that U(R)<U(D) to 
make sense of the conflict of interests between the woman and her family, but actually the model 
does not need that assumption, except for the fact that the solution is trivial when U(R)>U(D). We 
normalize the parent's utility to 0 < U(D) in the event of elopement. Factor δ < γ multiplies the 
parents' utilities in the third period, showing again that period two is the family's preferred time for 
their daughter's marriage.  
Because of the choice of p
reasons behind the parents' preferences and we may stay clear of any overly materialistic or 
romantic assumptions. Brideprices, educational choices and other considerations are clearly deemed 
important, but these topics stay behind the scenes in this decision tree.  
 
2 D is a shortcut for designated spouse, while R labels as Romeo the woman's chosen suitor. 
 
Graph 3 : The family decision tree 
 
he equilibrium of the game depends on three arbitrage equation. Solving backwards, the family 
the same as the third 
), (1 ) U(D) }  >  (1-q)δ U(D)/(γ-q δ)     (equation 1) 
plies that an 
                                               
 
T
will consent to a persisting suitor if and only if U(R) > (1-φ) U(D), i.e. if the risk of elopement is 
severe enough to outweigh the relative gain of pushing one's own candidate. 
The second arbitrage equation is a choice between three options, but two are 
period and are governed by the same comparison. Hence the decision to wait will be adopted if and 
only if :   
max{ U(R -φ
Now call U(2) the maximal utility deriving from the family's choice in period 2. Literally,   
U(2) = max {   γ U(R),  (1-φ) γ U(D), (1-q) δ U(D) + q δ max { U(R), (1-φ) U(D) } }. 
The arbitrage equation governing the family's choice in the early stage of the game im
early marriage will be chosen if and only if U(D) > (1-p) γ U(D) + p U(2), or, if 1- γ + γ p > 03 : 
U(D) > p U(2) / (1- γ + γ p)        (equation 2) 
 
3 We don't need to assume that 1- γ + γ p > 0, but the solution of the game boils down to 100% of early marriage 
when the converse inequality holds. 
 
Depending on equation (1), (2) and whether U(R) > (1-φ) U(D), eight equilibrium configurations 
obability 1-p and a timely love marriage with probability p ; 
) 
ty 1-pφ and elopement in the second period with 
nged marriage with probability 1-p, a late arranged marriage with probability  
omparative statics on the parameters U(R), U(D), γ, δ, p, q and φ will show jumps from one 
Graph 4 : Comparative Statics with respect to U(R) 
I R) 
 simple game-theoretic framework is that no change in the parameters of 
are possible. Four of them are equivalent, because the outcome of the game is an early arranged 
marriage with probability 1 when equation (2) holds, irrespective of the other conditions. The four 
other possibilities are the following : 
(a) a timely arranged marriage with pr
(b) a timely arranged marriage with probability 1-p, a late arranged marriage with probability p(1-q
and a late love marriage with probability pq ; 
(c) a timely arranged marriage with probabili
probability pφ ; 
(d)  a timely arra
p(1-qφ) and elopement in the third period with probability pqφ.  
 
C
equilibrium to another when a critical value is reached. Depending on the starting values of all the 
parameters, the transition may be different. The following graph illustrates the comparative statics 
with respect to U(R), which can represent either the parents' modernity or the daughter's soft 
bargaining power (i.e. making her candidate acceptable in her parents' view).  
 
(Arrows indicate a rising value of U(R) ) 
(1-p) tim. arr. 
p tim. chosen 
(1-p) timely arr. 
p(1-q) late arr. 
pq late chosen 
(1-pφ) tim. arr. 
pφ timely elop. 
(1-p) timely arr. 
p(1-qφ) late arr.  
pqφ late elop. 
Early arranged marriage with probability 1 
n this particular case, it is clear that the woman's welfare in equilibrium always improves if U(
rises, except if she has an intrinsic preference for marrying early irrespective of her groom (a case 
that does not seem likely). This would not be true in the comparative statics of the woman's hard 
bargaining instrument, namely the probability of elopement φ. A rising φ yields a double or 
nothing outcome, depending on the relative values of U(D) and γ U(R). Either the equilibrium is 
pushed towards the woman's timely marriage with her suitor if she finds one, or it is driven to an 
early arranged marriage.  
They key prediction of this
the model simultaneously rises the probability of a love marriage while decreasing the probability 
of a timely marriage. There is a non-linear relationship between marriage consent and the age at 
first marriage, enabling us to identify the parent's preferred age for their daughter's marriage as the 
point that maximizes the probability of a love marriage in equilibrium. Since the model assumes 
very little about the matching process between future spouses, about the sources of parental 
preferences and about the probabilities of finding and loosing a suitor, one might expect that this 
property is robust to a wide variety of assumptions and settings. 
It can be noticed that a strategic framework is not the only one generating an inverted-U 
relationship between the age at first marriage and the probability of a love marriage. A simple story 
with two classes of parents produces a similar outcome. Some parents want an arranged marriage 
for their daughter. Assume a uniform distribution of preferred marriage age among them. Other 
parents would rather let their daughter choose her husband herself. It is safe to assume that their 
preferred age for the marriage is higher than those who prefer an arranged marriage, because the 
bride must be mature enough to perform the choice herself. This would explain the upward slope of 
the relationship between marriage age and love marriage for low ages. Then, among the women 
who are expected to choose their husbands, some may fail to find an acceptable suitor and then turn 
back to their parents in order to get a spouse. This would explain the increasing probability of an 
arranged marriage in the rightmost part of the age interval. Although this story needs refinements 
because rational parents could anticipate the probable turn of events and act accordingly4, it 
constitutes an alternative explanation of an inverted-U shape of the curve linking age at first 
marriage to the probability of love marriage. The key observation is that the maximum probability 
of a love marriage would also coincide with the central point (mean, median,...) of the distribution 
of  preferred age at first marriage.  
We are now ready to proceed to the econometric estimations. The inverted-U shape of the 
4. Estimating preferences over marriage age with a cross-sectional data 
here are several difficulties in estimating the relationship between the bride's age at first marriage 
                                               
relationship between our endogenous variables must be verified and the average preferred age at 
first marriage may then be estimated and compared with the average actual age at first marriage.  
 
 
T
and the probability of a love marriage. There is no hope of circumventing the simultaneity bias by 
ways of instrumental variables. The identification problem is here insuperable, because each and 
every determinant of one variable will also be a determinant of the other. Identifying constraints 
could in principle take the form of restrictions on the functional forms, but no theoretical 
information is available about these forms. We are therefore left with a reduced-form approach. 
Predicted values for both endogenous variables will be estimated in separate equations : a duration 
model for age, a probit model for marriage consent. Then a second-order Taylor approximation of 
the relationship between the predicted values only, with no control, will be estimated. The 
parameters of this quadratic form have an unknown distribution because the data on which the 
curve is fitted are themselves produced by maximum-likelihood estimation. Fortunately, an 
argument tracing back to Mallar (1977) ensures that consistency is not lost in the process although 
general results about the asymptotic distribution of estimators are not available.  The needed 
assumption is that prediction errors on the endogenous variables are uncorrelated. The following 
picture will help us understand what this assumption means. 
 
 
4 Actually, re-introducing the parents' rational expectations would frame the mentioned story within our game tree, 
with a low p and a high q. 
Graph 5 : The average family's inverted-U curve 
Each family has a different curve, characterized in particular by a different maximum. We depicted 
in graph 5 the curve of an average family, implying that its peak in the probability of love marriage 
is the average ideal timing of marriage in the population. Several factors may make a particular 
family's curve different from the population average : exogenous traits observed in our sample, 
unobserved family characteristics or a prediction error on any axis. Furthermore, we observed only 
one point of the family's curve, namely the predicted timing and probability of love marriage. In 
order to make a correct estimation of the average curve, we must assume that the position of a given 
family along its curve is uncorrelated with the difference between its curve and the average family's 
curve.  
Although this does seem unrealistic, it leads to an a fortiori argument on the findings of our study. 
Indeed, a realistic assumption is that parents with a preference for early marriage are also those who 
are inclined to pick up a point early on the curve. Preference for marrying one's daughter at a low 
age is often associated with traditional views, namely in our framework, a high value of U(D) 
relative to U(R) and 0. These views in turn lead to the choice of an early arranged marriage, i.e. a 
marriage occurring still earlier than the parents' ideal timing (e.g. the fear of elopement is, as we 
have seen, a powerful motivation for a rushed marriage). If we accept such a correlation between 
the position on the curve in space and the position of parents on a curve, we will find that the 
estimated curve is flatter than the real one. Hence if our estimations actually find a significant 
curvature in the relationship between marriage age and consent, we may conclude a fortiori that this 
also holds in the population.   
Without further ado, we will now turn to the results of the estimations. Table 5 summarizes the 
probit equation for love marriage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted age at first marriage
         
Predicted probability of a love marriage 
Averageideal 
timing 
Exogenous factors 
Unobserved heterogeneity across families 
Prediction error on both axes 
p 
     
0
Table 5 : A Probit equation for love marriage  
Probit estimates                  Number of obs = 127 
LR chi2(6)    = 17.10           Prob > chi2  = 0.0089 
Log likelihood = -77.002081      Pseudo R2   = 0.0999 
----------------------------------------------------- 
love marriage|      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z| 
-------------+--------------------------------------- 
        time |  -.0432821   .0119902    -3.61   0.000 
  toucouleur |   -.164821   .2732734    -0.60   0.546 
   landopp.  |  -.1072573   .2844449    -0.38   0.706 
   landopp.2 |   -.290175   .3888758    -0.75   0.456 
 family plot |  -.1780703    .339812    -0.52   0.600 
    activity |  -.0790728   .4478164    -0.18   0.860 
    constant |   .6937084   .3161285     2.19   0.028 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
If this equation is globally significant, this can be attributed to the time counter (i.e. the woman's 
age at the time of the interview), on the one hand, and jointly to the other regressors on the other 
hand. Although no coefficient other than the one of Time is significantly different from zero, the set 
of all other coefficients is jointly different from the zero vector. A lot of colinearity between the 
regressors is to be blamed for the poor performance of each coefficient taken separately. The sign of 
the time counter is expected and denotes a growing preference for love marriage as time goes by. 
 
Table 6 shows the more encouraging estimation of a duration model for age at first marriage. In a 
duration model, one way to express the dependent variable is the probability of marrying at a given 
age, conditional on not having been married before. An alternative expression is the age at risk, 
i.e. before marriage actually occurred. The  specification presented below (a generalized log-gamma 
distribution of errors5) has been chosen because it is a good compromise between generality and 
parsimony in degrees of freedom. 
 
Table 6 : A duration (generalized log-gamma) model for age at first marriage 
LR chi2(6)      = 38.97         Prob > chi2  = 0.0000 
Log likelihood  = -95.979285                          
----------------------------------------------------- 
age “at risk”|      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z| 
-------------+--------------------------------------- 
        time |   -.021664   .0037979    -5.70   0.000 
  toucouleur |  -.1598305    .102267    -1.56   0.118 
   landopp.  |   .2310255   .1066429     2.17   0.030 
   landopp.2 |   -.084553   .1472989    -0.57   0.566 
 family plot |   .0128923   .1325368     0.10   0.923 
    activity |   .3039912   .1721485     1.77   0.077 
    constant |   2.009043   .1167239    17.21   0.000 
-------------+--------------------------------------- 
       sigma |    .496055   .0350309    -9.93   0.000 
       kappa |    .477501   .2328579     2.05   0.040 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
Again, the coefficient of the Time counter is significantly different from zero and denotes an 
intuitive increase of age at first marriage over time. Women who are older at the time of the 
interview have on average been married at a younger age. Village characteristics play also an 
important part in the phenomenon. Wherever a piece of land is formally reserved to women, 
marriage occurs at an older age. However, government-regulated irrigated plots give no further 
advantage in this respect. This is contrasting with the absence of impact of the woman's access to a 
land plot within her own family. Attributing or not a plot to woman in a given family is just part of 
the farming strategy, while a reserved access to external land is an asset that is intrinsically linked to 
                                                
5 This model only admits a accelerated-time representation. 
the woman. If she leaves her family, e.g. because she gets married, the asset leaves with her. While 
the level of her brideprice can offer some compensation for her departure, it appears in the 
estimation that her family is significantly eager to keep her for a longer time when she holds such 
an asset. This means that reserved access to external land is not completely re-appropriated by the 
woman's family (e.g. through the brideprice mechanism) and hence not neutral in the choice of her 
marriage's timing.  
If a woman has undertaken some commercial activity before marriage, her age at first marriage 
increases as if she was born fifteen years later, although this impact is only significant at an 8% 
confidence level. The reason for this phenomenon is probably that the woman's commercial activity 
before marriage is a proxy for her family's progressive attitudes. This contrasts with the non-
existing impact of her access to a family plot. While both choices are part of the same family plan, 
they reveal different intrinsic traits. Agriculture is a more traditional occupation than a commercial 
activity, e.g. it is easier to supervise the woman's whereabouts on a field than in a market within 
walking distance. 
 
Equipped with these two estimations, we are now in a position to test the inverted-U relationship 
between marriage age and consent. From the consent equation, we extract the logit of the 
probability of a love marriage, namely Ln P[love mar.]/(1-P[love mar.]). From the age equation, we 
extract the predicted median age at first marriage for each woman in the sample, translated so that 
an age of 12 is the origin. When we fit a second-degree curve to the full sample6, the following 
graph obtains. 
 
Graph 6 : Fitting the inverted-U relationship  
 
The inverted-U shape is further established by statistical inference based on bootstrapping. A joint 
one-tailed test for a positive first-degree coefficient and a negative second-degree coefficient gives 
us a significance of 3.63%.  It cannot be considered as a test of the theoretical framework developed 
in section 3, but a natural interpretation comes to mind if we identify, as argued before, the peak of 
the parabola as the parent's preferred age for first marriage.  
The smallest 50% confidence interval for the parent's preferred age is[ 17.7 ; 19.9 ], corresponding 
roughly to the interval between 6 and 8 on the X-axis of graph 6.  This is in total contradiction with 
                                                
6 Stefan Dercon is to be thanked for suggesting the fit of a non-parametric regression on the same data. However, this 
ideal solution turns out to be impractical due to the small number of observations and the difficulty to conduct 
statistical inference by conventional means.  
the smallest 50% interval of actual age at first marriage, which is the [14 ; 16] interval. A one-tailed 
means-test rejects, with less than 1% of error margin, the equality between the actual age of woman 
at first marriage and the peak of the estimated parabola on graph 6. This difference suggests that a 
majority of marriages are rushed in the sample. As it hardly corresponds to any player's interests, 
strategic considerations set aside, to rush the marriage, we can conclude that the configuration of 
incentives encountered in a majority of families in the sample is a source of Pareto-inefficiency. 
This inefficiency is no surprise in itself since there is at least one intuitive story that rationalizes it, 
namely that an early arranged marriage is concluded out of fear of the future presence of an 
unwanted suitor (as is shown in the game-theoretic framework developed in section 3). The real 
surprise is the magnitude of the gap between actual and preferred age at first marriage.  The upper 
bound of a 50% confidence interval of one variable is by two years smaller than the lower bound of 
a same interval of the other. This difference strikes us as huge. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We conducted an empirical investigation into the causes of marriage consent and age at first 
marriage among the women of fifteen villages in the Senegal River valley. The choice of an 
econometric specification and an intuition about the inverted-U relationship between the two 
endogenous variables are motivated by a game-theoretic framework emphasizing the role of the 
woman's family. Depending on the family's preferences and its beliefs about the appearance of a 
suitor, about the risk of elopement etc., several outcome are predicted, one of which corresponds to 
a rushed arranged marriage.  
In the data, we find evidence of a large gap between the parents' preferred age at first marriage 
(estimated as the age that maximizes the probability of a love marriage) and the actual marriage 
age.  This compelling inefficiency prompts us to think about policy tools that may pre-empt the 
motivations for rushed arranged marriages.  
The age marriage equation shows that access to land outside the family and access to a commercial 
activity leads to an increased age of the woman at first marriage. While the second regressor is a 
proxy for family traits that are probably beyond the reach of a planner, the first one is a well-
founded hope. 
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